

**HARNESSING DIASPORA RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHINA, INDIA, AND
SOUTH KOREA'S POLICIES AND STRATEGIES**

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ABSTRACT

Policies, strategies, and institutions are essential to channel diaspora resources toward national development. The main goal of the study is to analyze how China, India, and South Korea have harnessed the resources of their diaspora for national development. Our results show that each country has its uniqueness in terms of diaspora policies. However, all successful policies start with establishing a dedicated institution, granting legal status, and providing financial mechanisms for investment and incentives for the diaspora.

KEYWORDS: *Diaspora Engagement Policies, Components of Diaspora Policies, China, India, South Korea.*

1. INTRODUCTION

International remittances are one-way transactions without a corresponding economic value return to the sender, based on the interpersonal connection between the sender and recipient (Gelb S. &., 2018). Due to globalization, the number of migrants, and consequently, the volume of remittances, is increasing.

Globally, the volume of remittances has increased over the past two decades. The first slight decline was registered during the worldwide economic recession in 2008, and the second during the pandemic. While global remittances were predicted to decline by 14% by 2021 compared to 2019 pre-COVID-19 levels, they proved much more resilient than expected, registering a slight decline of 1.6% between 2019 and 2020. Remittance flows are increased by 1.6% between 2022 and 2023 and are projected to grow at a higher rate of 3% in 2024 (Figure 1.) (World-Bank KNOMAD, 2024).



Figure 1. Remittance inflows (US\$ billion) (World-Bank KNOMAD, 2024)

This upward trend continues to be robust due to expanding remittance service providers' networks and lowering costs, improving data collection on migration and remittances, and increasing migrant incomes and stocks. Moreover, improved monitoring of international flows—undertaken to prevent the financing of illicit activities—has also enhanced remittance tracking (Olivie, 2022).

Almost 75% of remittances are received by low- and middle-income countries. In 2023, the top five recipient countries for remittance inflows were India (USD 120 billion), Mexico (USD 66 billion), China (USD 50 billion), the Philippines (USD 39 billion), and Pakistan (USD 27 billion) (Figure 2). India has been the largest recipient of remittances since 2008 (World-Bank KNOMAD, 2024).




Figure 2. Top 10 remittance recipient countries (amount of inflow remittances in bln USD) (World-Bank KNOMAD, 2024)

Digital remittances are sent via a payment instrument online or self-assisted and received in transaction accounts, including bank accounts, microfinance institution accounts, or mobile money accounts (Guermond, 2022). Digital remittances uptake emerged as an essential financial tool for migrants and recipients during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when physical transfers were impossible, primarily through informal channels, due to the closure of borders. The limited access to traditional remittance infrastructure increased demand for cashless, remote methods of sending money across borders. As a result, many migrants turned to digital remittance tools, thus also increasing formal remittance flows (D. Harris, 2021).

Remittances are vital for supporting remote regions. They reduce poverty by increasing household income and purchasing power (Deonanan, 2020; Fonta, 2015). However, remittances alone cannot drive economic development. They often lead to higher spending, inflation, price increases in the property market, disparities between remittance recipients and non-recipients, and a culture of over-dependency and reliance on funds from abroad (Mishra A. K., 2016). If remittances are not channeled into investments, the brain drain effect can undermine the benefits of this income source (Fang, 2023).

Migration is an old phenomenon and a prerequisite for remittances and the formation of diasporas (Constant, 2016). While financial remittances are the most visible economic benefit, there are also social remittances, such as transferring technologies, knowledge, and innovations from destination countries to the home country (Deonanan, 2020; Karikari, 2016; Fromentin, 2017). Recognizing the critical importance of remittances, the governments of low—and middle-income countries have begun to explore other contributions that migrants and diaspora members can offer.

A major limitation of existing research is the lack of comparative analysis of different countries' diaspora policies. Scholars often focus on individual policy components without providing a holistic view. Additionally, these comparisons do not present digital approaches implemented in recent years. This study aims to fill these gaps and contribute to the academic literature. We conduct a comparative analysis of the diaspora policies of China, India, and South Korea. These countries were selected for three reasons: they are well-developed economies, they have large diaspora populations scattered around the globe, and they have successfully implemented diaspora engagement policies (ECPR, 2024). Understanding how these countries leverage their diaspora to facilitate the flow of investments, technology, knowledge, innovation, and business opportunities is crucial for developing mutually beneficial policies for diaspora members and their home countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature and introduces the definitions of components of diaspora engagement policies. Section 3 examines the diaspora engagement policies of the People's Republic of China, India, and South Korea. Section 4 presents a conclusion.

2. Literature review

The term diaspora refers to individuals, communities, and populations living outside of their country of origin. This term includes permanent and temporary migrants, their children, and subsequent generations (Wickramasekara P. T., 2018). Diaspora engagement policies are defined

as a national strategy aimed at reaching out to the diaspora and utilizing their resources for the economic development of their countries of origin (Butsch, 2020).

These policies range from protecting migrants to strengthening the sense of national identity among their decedents and promoting remittances and investments through their linkages (Vezzoli, 2010). The development and implementation of diaspora engagement policies demonstrate how governments, policymakers, and citizens think beyond national borders to create non-territorial forms of organization (Jovan Filipovic, 2012). These policies consist of strategies that help migrants secure their status in foreign states and contribute to the welfare of their homeland (Chen, 2021).

Diaspora engagement policies have both international and internal elements. They are an integral part of the development strategies in many countries, contributing to technological progress and industrial transformation (Lim, 2018). Policymakers recognize the diversity within the diaspora in terms of ethnicity, community of origin, gender, migration status, skill profiles, and generations to develop specific strategies for each group (Wickramasekara P. T., 2018; Mencutek, 2018). These policies should mutually benefit diaspora members and their ancestral homelands (Stojkov, 2023; Constant, 2016). Understanding the diaspora engagement policies of other countries and learning from their experiences is crucial for developing effective strategies.

While early police studies focused on the financial potential of the diaspora, particularly in the form of remittances (Baser, 2022; Goldring, 2004; Devkota, 2016; Fonta, 2015; Kakhkharov J. &., 2020), recent research has shifted towards social remittances, such as knowledge, skills, innovation, business ideas (Gamlen A. , 2014; Di Iasio, 2022; Fackler, 2020). A review of the interdisciplinary literature reveals various objectives for these policies. In Lithuania and Jamaica, such policies focus on supporting the population abroad and encouraging return migration. Chile, Australia, and New Zealand are working on creating diaspora business networks that can support their homeland. Ireland, India, and Scotland have more pluralistic approaches, encompassing overseas support, remittances, charity, and business connections (Ancien, 2009).

When it comes to the components of diaspora policies, (Vezzoli, 2010) categorizes four specific elements, each playing a crucial role in the diaspora engagement landscape. These include facilitating remittance transfers and investments, promoting SMEs in origin countries, and encouraging the transfer of technologies, knowledge, and skills. (Ancien, 2009) further identifies ten different aspects of these policies, while (Gamlen A., 2018) divides them into two groups: one focusing on state interests and the other fulfilling the state obligations. (UNCDF, 2021) identifies twenty-three mechanisms for diaspora finance. (Park, 2021) highlights three main elements of diaspora policies: legal, informational, and psychological, each of which carries significant weight in the diaspora engagement discourse.

After reviewing the literature, we adopt the taxonomy developed by(Isaeva, 2024) for our analyses. This taxonomy identifies four key aspects of diaspora engagement policies: legal, institutional, financial, and informational/cultural. Each aspect contains several components. Legal approaches involve changes in regulation and legislation. Institutional strategies describe the organizations that should be established. Financial mechanisms focus on enabling diaspora financing. Informational and cultural aspects encompass events, projects, and programs that

foster engagement with the diaspora. In the next section, we use this taxonomy to conduct comparative analyses of the diaspora engagement policies of China, India, and South Korea.

3. Diaspora engagement policies of China, India and South Korea

China, India, and South Korea have different histories, migration patterns, and approaches to engaging their diaspora populations. These countries demonstrate that “one size does not fit all,” and a broad range of approaches exists. Each government has designed its policies and strategies based on its interests and the specific situation of its diaspora. China, India, and South Korea have recognized the potential of their diaspora and successfully engaged them in national development and growth, thereby creating a positive image of the country and increasing its soft power.

This study explores the policies and strategies of China, India, and South Korea to stimulate diaspora engagement and boost diaspora financing. We systematically review secondary sources, such as government and research agency reports, articles, and other online resources. Table 1 presents the findings from the comparative analysis of the diaspora engagement policies of these countries.

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES OF CHINA, INDIA, AND SOUTH KOREA

	China	India	South Korea
Legal			
Definition of diaspora	HuaqiaovaHuaren	NRI va PIO	Kyopos, Koryos, Chosuns
Status of diaspora	Overseas Chinese Certificate	OCI card	H2 and F4 visas, dual citizenship
Rights of diaspora	Rights and benefits can vary depending on local regulations	Multiple entry lifelong visa, registration exemption, property ownership (excluding agricultural land), rights to study, work, business activities	Multiple entry visa valid for five years, simplified registration, property ownership (excluding agricultural land), rights to study, work, business activities
Institutional			
Diaspora Affairs	Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC)	Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council of Overseas Indians, Indian Council of Overseas Employment, Indian Community Welfare Fund	Division for Overseas Koreans at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Korean Policy Committee
Diaspora research	Huaqiao University and Social Sciences Academy	High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora	Overseas Korean Foundation
Education and Culture	Confucius Institutes, ACFROC Youth Committee	Overseas Indian Centers, Indian culture services	King Sejong Institute, Overseas Korean Agency
Investment	Hui-zhang-centers, local diaspora offices	Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre	Overseas Korean Traders Association

	of OCAO	(OIFC), Local diaspora offices	
Financial			
Remittances	Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)	Integrated Remittances Gateway	
Products for diaspora banking	Insurance and pension schemes	NRI deposit, insurance and pension schemes, diaspora bonds in 1991,1998 and 2000	Checking and saving accounts, insurance, and pension schemes
Investment	Economic zones in traditional diaspora hometowns, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention	Community Development Financial Institution, Indian Diaspora Investment Initiative	World Korean Business Conventions
Informational and Cultural			
Education	Language and cultural courses in 556 Confucius institutions	Scholarship program for diaspora children, language and cultural courses in 37 Indian centers	“Korean Homeland Education” program, language and cultural courses in 248 branches of King Sejong Institute
Programs	“Spring Sunshine Plan,” “Thousand Talents Program,” “Thousand Youth Talents Program,” “China Root-seeking Tour” program	“Swarnajayanti Fellowship,” “Ramalingaswamy Re-entry Fellowship,” “Outstanding Scientist of Indian origin,” “Tracing the Roots” project	“Employment Management Program”, “Visit and Employment Program”, “First Trip Home” project
Diaspora day		PravasiBharatiya Divas, PravasiBharatiyaSamman Awards	Korean Day for Overseas Koreans
Platforms	“My China Roots” online platform, WeChat, WEBEX	Global Indian Network of Knowledge	Global Network of Korean Scientists and Engineers

This table highlights key components of the diaspora engagement policies in China, India, and South Korea, showcasing various strategies for fostering connections with diaspora communities. The following section provides a detailed exploration of each country’s case individually.

3.1.China

China has the largest diaspora in the world. More than 10.7 million Chinese live overseas; the total Chinese diaspora population, including their descendants, is approximately 60 million (World Bank, 2021). Historically, Chinese migration was concentrated in South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. However, over the past two decades, the number of Chinese diaspora members in the United States, Canada, and Spain has increased sharply (Figure 3).




Figure 1. Top ten destination countries of Chinese migrants (in millions)(World Bank, 2021).

The Chinese diaspora is characterized by hyper-mobility, hyper-diversity, and hyper-connectivity (Guo, 2022). Since the 1990s, the Chinese have actively engaged its diaspora, cultivating long-distance nationalism among overseas Chinese (Chen, 2021). The Nationality Law of China prohibits dual citizenship since 1980. In 2009, China reformed its diaspora policies through the Provisions on Defining the Identities of Overseas Chinese, Chinese of Foreign Nationalities, Returned Overseas Chinese, and Relatives of Overseas Chinese. This document categorized the diaspora into two groups: Huaqiao and Huaren. Huaren refers to migrants and their descendants who are citizens of other countries. Huaqiao refers to citizens of China residing abroad (Tan, 2021; Guo, 2022).

Two major organizations are responsible for formulating and implementing policies concerning overseas Chinese, namely, the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC)(Liu H. &., 2016; Agunias D. R., 2009). Established in 1949 and re-branded in 1978, the OCAO operates within the Chinese central government, with offices extending to provincial, municipal, county, township, and village levels (Liu J. M., 2022). Until 2018, OCAO's primary role was developing and implementing diaspora policies. In 2018, several units of OCAO were absorbed by the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and the function of liaising with emigrants was transferred to ACFROC (Schäfer, 2022).

The ACFROC, founded in 1956 and revitalized in 1978, initially focused solely on migrant returnees (Liu J. M., 2022). However, it gradually expanded its reach to include a growing number of Chinese overseas students. Today, ACFROC manages a wide range of activities, including liaising with overseas Chinese and their dependents and returnees and organizing academic and cultural programs (Tan, 2021; Thunø, 2024).

Huaqiao University and Social Sciences Academic Press publishes the Annual Report on Overseas Chinese Studies, offering analyses of diaspora policies and recommendations (Y. Jia, 2023). Since the 1990s, its network of a dozen institutions has formed an institutional connection between overseas Chinese and China, contributing to developing diaspora policy guidelines (Schäfer, 2022). In 2004, China established Confucius Institutes to promote Chinese language and culture, support international Chinese language education, and facilitate cultural exchanges. By 2024, there are 556 institutions in 154 countries (Confucius Institute, 2024). The ACFROC's Youth Committee, founded in 2001, fosters economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, particularly among youth. The China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, established in 2003, supports overseas Chinese enterprises and strengthens entrepreneurial organizations (Liu H. &, 2016).

China places particular emphasis on attracting investment, technology, and Chinese talents from abroad. In 1996, the Ministry of Education launched the "Spring Sunshine Plan" to recruit overseas Chinese talent with notable achievements to work at Chinese universities on a short-term basis. This initiative facilitated the return of numerous science and engineering graduate students from developed countries, consequently fostering high-tech business development (Devane, 2006). The "Thousand Talents Program," initiated by the Central Organizational Department in 2008, aimed to recruit leading scientists, research professionals, technological innovators, and entrepreneurs. This program included the "Innovative Talents Project" and the "Entrepreneurial Talents Project", targeting overseas Chinese under the age of 55 (Tan, 2021). Over six years, the program has recruited more than 4,000 talents (Tigau, 2017). In 2011, the "Thousand Youth Talents Program" was launched, targeting individuals under the age of 40 who have earned a doctoral degree from prestigious foreign universities in the fields of natural science, engineering, and technology (Cao, 2020).

Special economic zones have been established in traditional diaspora hometowns in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, granting the diaspora legal privileges in social welfare and economic investments. The Chinese government actively supports Chinese companies abroad to enhance economic cooperation between China and other countries (Liu J. M., 2022). Since 1991, the central government has organized the annual World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention to promote economic cooperation among overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and business communities worldwide. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, seeks to create new business opportunities for the Chinese diaspora. In 2017, two online platforms - the Overseas Chinese and BRI Information Releasing Platform and the website for the Coordination of BRI Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurial Organizations - were launched, involving more than 270 entrepreneurial organizations (Ren, 2022).

Between 1978 and 2017, more than 84% of Chinese students studying abroad returned to China, with over 24,000 employing approximately 3.1 million returnees in more than 300 pioneer parks by 2017. By 2022, 60% of Chinese university rectors, 81% of science academy staff, and 50% of department heads at the Ministry of Science and Technology were repatriated overseas Chinese (Schäfer, 2022). China's success in attracting investments from its diaspora has also been significant (Tigau, 2017). By 2020, around 70% of foreign investments in China were attributed to the diaspora (Song C. &, 2021).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, China transformed the crisis into an opportunity for transnational nation-building and power enhancement through digital technologies. Engaging with the diaspora via the WeChat application enabled real-time interactive communication and facilitated donations. Although exact figures are unavailable, evidence indicate that AFROC's fundraising efforts were met with positive responses globally (Ceccagno, 2023). Digital services, such as online notary services, online litigation, and health and judicial chat groups, were provided via Weixin in close collaboration with local offices of AFROC and overseas Chinese associations (Thunø, 2024).

It is difficult to have accurate figures on the total number of overseas Chinese associations. As of 2024, estimates suggest there are over 20.000 associations globally, with approximately 7.000 in Malaysia, 3.000 in the United States, and 2.000 in Europe (Xiang, 2024). These associations, along with Hui-zhang centers, play an increasingly important role in facilitating the penetration of Chinese capital into foreign countries (Chen, 2021).

Historically, the relationship between China and its diaspora was predominantly characterized by remittances and investments. However, since the 1990s, the focus has shifted toward social remittances (Schäfer, 2022). The government of China dedicates time and resources to research to explore diaspora and its needs before investing in the development of institutional support to assist, encourage, and protect diaspora members. To maximize the role of its diaspora in national development, China employs multi-dimensional and multi-scalar linkages, particularly in attracting highly skilled talent and engaging the diaspora in public diplomacy. The country's remarkable economic development and investment booms would not have been possible without the support of the diaspora. Nonetheless, China's diaspora-development nexus remains heavily state-controlled, with little input from diaspora organizations and individuals shaping diaspora policies.

3.2.India

In 1998, India created the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) cards, and in 2003, Non-Resident Indians (NRI) status. NRI refers to an Indian citizen residing abroad and holding an Indian passport, while PIO refers to a person with Indian ancestry without Indian citizenship. These two schemes were merged in 2015 into the Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) card (Harijanti, 2018). All PIOs, except citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh, can apply for an OCI card. They allow multiple entries, multi-purpose, lifelong visas for living and working in India (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017). India has over 32 million diaspora members residing in more than 134 countries (Dwivedi, 2023). The United States hosts the highest number of overseas Indians, followed by the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia (Figure 4).




Figure 2. Indian diaspora in the world (in millions)(Dwivedi, 2023)

A Special Coordination Division in the Ministry of External Affairs was established in 1985 as the agency to coordinate affairs related to overseas Indians. In 2000, the NRI/PIO division was created to deal exclusively with issues relating to the Indian diaspora under the Ministry of External Affairs. At the same time, a High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora was established to conduct diaspora research and develop policy frameworks and strategies to forge a mutually beneficial relationship with the diaspora (Mishra A. K., 2016; Loshkariov, 2023). The Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre was launched in 2007 to secure Indian diaspora investments, facilitate business partnerships, function as a clearinghouse for all investment-related information, and provide advisory services to investors about opportunities and trends in the Indian economy (Pande, 2017). The Prime Minister's Global Advisory Council of Overseas Indians was established in 2009 to harness diaspora resources for national development (MFA, 2023).

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was established in 2004 to coordinate migration-related affairs. The Ministry worked in three directions: enhancing linkages with development work, promoting circular and return migration, and addressing the needs of specialized groups. In 2016, it merged with the Ministry of External Affairs of India (MEA, 2016). The Indian Council of Overseas Employment was founded in 2008 as a strategic 'think tank' on overseas employment markets for Indians and overseas Indian workers (Agarwala, 2015). The Indian Community Welfare Fund, set up in 2009, aims to assist overseas Indian nationals in times of distress and emergency (Chanda, 2018). Since 2010, the Global Indian Network of Knowledge has expanded the intellectual engagement of Global Indians with their counterparts in India. It is an online knowledge network of doctors, scholars, and technologists. This network facilitates connections, advice sharing, and research opportunities (Li, 2019).

Some states in India have local diaspora offices, such as Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, the NRI Division in Gujarat, and the NRI Commissioner in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. The Kerala government created the Non-Resident Keralite Affairs in 1996 primarily to protect its migrant workers from abuse and exploitation. Today, it addresses complaints against illegal recruitment agencies, assists stranded Keralites, and facilitates the repatriation of bodies. It also has an

insurance scheme for unemployed returnees, unskilled laborers, and domestic workers. In Gujarat, the local government created an NRI Division within its administration department to strengthen ties with Gujaratis abroad. For a fee of 5 US dollars, the office issues a “Gujarat Card” to Gujaratis living in other Indian states and outside India. Cardholders receive special treatment at Gujarat government offices and large discounts at local hotels and shops (Agunias D. R., 2009; Mishra A. K., 2016).

In addition, India has an Overseas Indian Association and philanthropic funds worldwide that serve as field formations on matters relating to overseas Indians. In the UK alone, there are over three hundred Indian-led migrant organizations. These associations reveal the dynamism of the Indian diaspora in terms of development issues (Vezzoli, 2010).

India’s exchange regime, which strongly restricted remittances to India, was liberalized in 2000 (Vezzoli, 2010). In 2006, India launched the Integrated Remittances Gateway, enabling NRIs to send money instantaneously anywhere in India within 24 hours (Indo-Asian News Service, 2006). As a result, since 2011, India has been receiving the largest amount of remittances in the world. In 2023, remittance inflows exceeded 80 billion US dollars (World Bank-KNOMAD, 2024).

The State Bank of India has successfully issued diaspora bonds in three issues. India Development Bonds, issued following the balance of payments crisis in 1991, raised 1.6 billion US dollars. Resurgent India Bonds issued following sanctions imposed after nuclear testing 1998 raised 4.2 billion US dollars. India Millennium Deposits in 2000 raised 5.5 billion US dollars. All bonds were issued without US Securities and Exchange Commission registration. Bonds had a non-negotiable fixed rate with a five-year maturity. Bonds could be redeemed by family members in India in rupees or repatriated by migrants in foreign currency (Ketkar, 2010; Ancien, 2009; Mishra A. K., 2016). The exclusivity was particularly effective in India because it is believed that the Indian diaspora prefers to invest in instruments exclusive to them and hold assets in Indian rupees (Ozaki, 2016). However, India has not made diaspora bonds a regular feature of its foreign financing and has used them as a source of emergency finance.

Since 2005, India has offered non-resident ordinary accounts in rupees, which are non-repatriable, repatriable accounts in rupees, and repatriable accounts in six foreign currencies. Foreign currency non-resident deposits have high interest rates and one to five years of fixed terms. The interest and balance of this deposit are exempt from income and wealth taxes, respectively. Holders of foreign currency non-resident deposits can obtain loans in India and abroad, both in domestic and foreign currencies (UNCDF, 2021). These deposit schemes remain essential for obtaining foreign capital (Tigau, 2017). The Social Security Agreement allows all NRIs and PIOs to use the National Pension System (Odermatt, E., 2013). To alleviate double taxation, Indian authorities amended budget legislation in 2020 to exempt Indian expats from paying tax on overseas income (Loshkariov, 2023).

Returned migrants transfer technologies and global standards into Indian startups (George, 2023). While the Indian diaspora provides only 3% of India’s foreign direct investment, they play a significant role in high-tech development, particularly in the software industry. India is an excellent example for other developing countries, as its software industry has grown through diaspora investment and entrepreneurship (Devane, 2006).

Policies regarding return migration had gained momentum since the late 1990s when government institutions started offering contractual positions and fellowships to outstanding overseas Indian scientists, technologists, and academics. The Department of Science and Technology within India's Ministry of Science and Technology initiated the Swarna jayanti Fellowship in 1997. This scholarship was for Indian nationals aged 30-40 years who were residing abroad and had the potential to promote scientific endeavors in the economy. In 2006, "The Ramalingaswamy Re-entry Fellowship" was launched to facilitate the return of highly skilled diaspora members, targeting Indian scientists aged under 55 working in overseas institutions or universities who wish to return and pursue their research interests in Indian institutions. In 2008, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India launched a fellowship for "Outstanding Scientist/Scientists-Technologists of Indian origin." The program was offered to scientists of Indian origin to come back or leverage their expertise for the growth of research and development in the country (Li, 2019).

The Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards and Pravasi Bharatiya Divas were introduced in 2003. Pravasi Bharatiya Divas is celebrated on January 9 every year to mark the contribution of Overseas Indians to India's development. Annually, up to 20 members of the Indian diaspora who have made significant national and global contributions receive the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards during the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas. The Know India Program, launched in the same year, is a three-week internship organized by the Ministry of External Affairs for PIOs aged 21-35. The program's primary objective is to promote social, economic, and cultural awareness of India among second and subsequent generations of PIOs (Singh, 2018). Since 2008, the genealogy service "Tracing the Roots" has helped PIOs trace their roots in India. The Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children, launched in 2006, allows children of PIOs and NRIs to pursue higher education in various fields at Indian universities/institutes (MEA, 2023). However, all these programs primarily target the privileged professional-class diaspora working in high-tech jobs in the United States and Western Europe, excluding citizens of neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh (Bauböck, 2010).

The government's perception of migrants and overseas Indians has shifted from negative to positive over the past two decades. In parallel, India embarked on a broader development path through investments in the economy and education, which created a more favorable environment that allowed diaspora engagement policies to accelerate the pace of diaspora engagement. However, it would be naïve to expect that specific diaspora engagement policies could have succeeded without a broader development dynamic creating an attractive investment environment. In summary, India's diaspora engagement policies promote the idea that the Indian diaspora's first loyalty is to their destination country. Indian patriotism should align with building affiliation to the new home.

3.3.South Korea

Brain drain was a significant issue in South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s when many Koreans left for better opportunities in Western countries. In the 1990s, South Korea began to view its diaspora as a valuable asset. The country's diaspora engagement policies were a response to a demographic crisis, falling fertility rates, and a stagnating economy. The first step of these policies was facilitating the return of the diaspora (Lim, 2018).

The Korean diaspora has seen significant growth over the decades. In 1960, the number of overseas Koreans was approximately 2.07 million (Figure 5). This figure has steadily increased, reaching around 7.49 million by 2019 (S. Lee, 2024). The diaspora is widely dispersed, with the largest communities in China, the United States, Japan, and Canada, and some notable communities in Australia, Russia, and Uzbekistan (Song C. , 2014).

There are three main groups of Koreans: Kyopos, who reside in the United States, Europe, and Japan; Koryos, based in former Soviet Union countries; and Chosuns - the Korean diaspora in China (Mylonas, 2013). South Korea granted them virtual extraterritorial citizenship to attract the diaspora under the Immigration and Legal Status of Koreans Overseas Act in 1999. The act introduced the H2 and F4 visa schemes and was amended in 2004 to include the Chosuns. It




Figure 3. Number of overseas Koreans (in million people) (S. Lee, 2024)

granted overseas Koreans the right to enter South Korea freely, conduct business, own real estate, use foreign exchange transactions, and access health insurance and pensions (Harjanti, 2018).

In a further step, South Korea recognized dual citizenship in 2010 (Constant, 2016). By 2011, the country granted overseas Koreans the right to vote in presidential and National Assembly elections from their country of residence (Hong, 2017; ESCAP, 2020). However, policies regarding the diaspora vary depending on the host country and the individuals' age. For example, policies concerning the Kyopos differ from those targeting the Koryos. Additionally, while Koreans over 60 are eligible for citizenship, younger Koreans are not (Constant, 2016).

The leading institution overseeing migrant Koreans is the Division for Overseas Koreans within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Overseas Korean Policy Committee, which is affiliated with the central government, continuously monitors and discusses Diaspora-related policies. The committee includes Vice Ministers from other ministries (Hong, 2017). The Overseas Korean Foundation was established in 1997 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a non-profit

organization that encourages overseas Koreans to visit their homeland, promotes research, builds a network of talented Kyopos, and fosters Korean language and culture among overseas Koreans and their descendants (Agunias D. , 2010).

The Korean Ministry of Science and Technology launched the Global Network of Korean Scientists and Engineers in 1999 to promote connections among diaspora members. The network taps into the knowledge and skills of Koreans abroad to advance science, technology, and business in Korea. At the same time, it helps the Korean business community connect with overseas scientists and engineers (Eun-Ja, 2017; Song C. , 2014).

Since 1998, the Overseas Korean Foundation has run several programs to support, assist, and reconnect Korean adoptees worldwide with their ethnic homeland. The First Trip Home program, launched in 2008, assists overseas Korean adoptees in finding their birth families (G.O.A'L., 2020). The Ministry of Women and Family organizes reconnection services for ethnic Korean women married to foreigners (Song C. , 2014). Since 1998, Korean Homeland Education has offered programs to cultivate the ethnic identity of overseas Koreans and help second and third generations of overseas Koreans grow into global talents (NIIED, 2024). The King Sejong Institute is responsible for teaching the Korean language and disseminating Korean culture abroad. 2024 the institution has more than 248 branches in 85 countries (Ri, 2024). In 2007, the Korean government designated October 5 as Korean Day for overseas Koreans to honor and contribute to the harmony and development of overseas ethnic Koreans worldwide (Lyan, 2019).

The Overseas Korean Foundation and the Overseas Korean Traders Association have hosted the annual World Korean Business Convention since 2002 to connect overseas Koreans with the business community in South Korea (WKBC, 2023). In addition, more than 3.000 economic, political, social, and cultural Korean associations are operating globally. They offer various services, such as Korean language classes and cultural and religious events (Agunias D. , 2010).

The case of South Korea illustrates that state, policymakers, and public institutions play a significant role in harnessing the diaspora for the home country's development. Through diaspora engagement policies, South Korea transformed “brain drain” into “brain gain” and now benefits from the return migration of elite scientists and engineers. These policies have yielded economic, political, and cultural benefits. South Korea has built a new nation of expatriate Koreans, including ethnic Koreans, wherever they reside (Song C. , 2014). While Koreans in developed countries contribute their professional knowledge, Koreans in China and former Soviet Union countries contribute with their labor (Song C. &, 2021). The Overseas Korean Foundation continues to foster a Korean identity among the diaspora, enhancing and expanding economic and political cooperation. The experience of South Korea in diaspora engagement offers valuable lessons for other countries with similar ambitions.

4. CONCLUSION

Diaspora affairs involve a complex combination of economic and political aspects, reflecting the heterogeneous nature of diaspora communities. We aim to determine which policies should be adopted to harness the full potential of the diaspora and ensure optimal outcomes. To answer this research question, we examine the diaspora policies of three countries: China, India, and South Korea. We explore how the governments of these countries have engaged their respective

Diasporas in the interest of national development. Specifically, the study assesses four main components of diaspora policies: legal, institutional, financial, and cultural.

Despite the continuous increase in remittances to Uzbekistan, no study has analyzed the policies and instruments that harness other diaspora resources. In this study, we aim to close this research gap. We use findings and interpretations from a literature review to design a new taxonomy. Using this taxonomy, we systemically review the diaspora engagement policies of the People's Republic of China, India, and South Korea. This study proposes diaspora policies for Uzbekistan.

The findings suggest that home countries must establish dedicated government institutions responsible for developing and implementing diaspora policies to benefit from diaspora knowledge, innovation, and finance. They should also grant legal status and privileges to diaspora members and provide a financial mechanism for diaspora investment. Lastly, cultural and informational approaches should be introduced to decrease information asymmetry and build trust with the diaspora.

Currently, Uzbekistan has no dedicated policies for its diaspora. The country is in the early stages of forming diaspora policies. Current policies focus more on migrant workers and protecting citizens. The Government of Uzbekistan should recognize the potential of the diaspora beyond remittances and develop long-term plans and policies for engaging with them. These policies should clearly define the diaspora, establish government institutions to manage diaspora affairs, and provide incentives for diaspora members. Recognition of dual citizenship or granting a specific status to the diaspora are also important steps in engagement. This can be achieved through continuous dialogue, consultations, and cooperation with the diaspora and by establishing specific institutions and platforms that facilitate effective diaspora engagement and support.

This study draws insights potentially valuable for policymakers considering the design or management of diaspora engagement policies. Regardless of the number and destination of the diaspora population, the experiences of the countries in this study highlight the importance of migration. Migrants are a source of investment capital, entrepreneurship, technology, knowledge, and business networks. They often possess greater capabilities and are more entrepreneurial than non-migrants. Even migrants who have “failed” in destination countries may have acquired skills and networks there that enable them to be competitive upon returning to their country of origin. Migrants and diaspora members have helped China become a massive manufacturing power, India becomes a global technology hub, and South Korea become a leading digital nation.

This study is an important resource for academics and policymakers seeking to understand the current trends and insights into diaspora policies. Academics and policymakers can gain a comprehensive understanding of the diaspora policies of India, China, and South Korea. Scholars can adopt the taxonomy in this study to analyze the diaspora engagement policies of other countries. While this study presents a modest effort to analyze diaspora policies, it may have missed some valuable research from other sources. Additionally, the literature review approach is qualitative, which may limit the generalization of the results and advocate for caution in interpretation. Through our analysis, we have advanced a systematic literature review and comparative analysis that can be easily replicated in the future for continuous updates.

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